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1.I ntroduction
Metalinguistic negation (MN) is interesting for at least the following two
reasons: (a) it is one instance of the much broader, very widespread and
various phenomenon of metarepresentational use in linguistic communi-
cation, whose semantic and pragmatic properties are currently being
extensively explored by both linguists and philosophers of language; (b) it
plays a central role in recent accounts of presupposition-denial cases, such as
`The king of France is not bald; there is no king of France'. It is this latter
employment that discussion of metalinguistic negation has focused on since
Horn (1985)'s key article on the subject. While Burton-Roberts (1989a,
1989b) saw the MN account of presupposition-denials as providing strong
support for his semantic theory of presupposition, I have oﬀered a multi-
layered pragmatic account of these cases, which also involves MN, but
maintains the view that the phenomenon of presupposition is pragmatic
(Carston 1994, 1996, 1998a).
In this response to Burton-Roberts's reply (1999, in this volume) to
Carston (1998a), I would like, eventually, to shift the focus to the ®rst of the
two issues, MN as a subtype of metarepresentational use. But since several
of Burton-Roberts's (B-R hereafter) comments concern presuppositional
issues and, more pressingly, the matter of the semantics}pragmatics
distinction, I will address these ®rst, albeit ¯eetingly. So in the next section,
I return brie¯y to Horn's (alleged) dilemma and the (alleged) incompatibility
of a pragmatic approach to presupposition with a treatment of pre-
supposition-denials in terms of MN. In Carston (1998a), I presented a range
of evidence against B-R's contention that presupposition-denials, like Horn's
cases involving corrections of linguistic form (for example, `I didn't see two
[1] Many thanks to Deirdre Wilson and Eun-Ju Noh for stimulating conversations on
metarepresentational use, and to Vladimir Z ) egarac for helpful comments on an earlier
draft. I'm very grateful, once again, to Noel Burton-Roberts, for an enjoyable e-mail
exchange on pineapples, sacking vs. killing and other issues relevant to this paper.
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mongeese; I saw two mongooses'), are semantic contradictions. B-R's
(1989b) `semantic contradiction' account has now been developed into (or
replaced by) his account (1993}97) in terms of a `pragmatic contradiction',
which, as he points out, bears striking similarity to my own. The remaining
diﬀerences between us concern the encoded semantic content of negative
presuppositional sentences and the principle responsible for bridging the gap
between the encoded semantics and the presupposition-preserving (hence-
forth P-preserving) interpretation, which is then contradicted by the follow-
up clause. These diﬀerences are the subject of section 3. Then, in the
following section, I touch again on the ever contentious semantics}
pragmatics distinction. There are several ways of drawing this distinction,
due to there being several diﬀerent ways of construing semantics. This is only
problematic if one is unclear what sort of semantics one is dealing in; I claim
that the relevance-theoretic distinction, which I employ, is both clear and
coherent.
In the ®nal section of his paper, B-R reconsiders the nature of
`metalinguistic negation', distinguishes a special subclass (his `!MN') and
makes some pertinent observations about slip of the tongue cases (`¯aunting'
for `¯outing', for instance); this is very interesting and marks a moving on
from the issues that he and I, probably for quite long enough, have been
debating. Following his positive lead, in my ®nal section, I look at a range
of diﬀerent types of metarepresentation falling within the scope of negation.
At this stage, the main point of diﬀerence between us concerns the
interpretation of the negation operator itself: B-R claims that in his !MN
cases it is non-truth-functional, while I reiterate my position that it is the
standard truth-functional negation, operating over a propositional form, a
substantial part of which is not semantically encoded but must be recovered
by pragmatic enrichment. The presence of formal linguistic (phonetic,
morphological, syntactic) material, or even of non-linguistic sounds or
marks, in the scope of the negation operator makes no diﬀerence to the
interpretation of the operator itself.
2.P resupposition and ambiguity of negation
B-R thinks Horn's views on negation and presupposition-cancellation
presented him with a dilemma; I don't (and nor does Horn). Horn (1985,
1989) advocated a presupposition-cancelling semantics for negation (his
predicate-denial negation), while insisting that, in actual use, presupposition-
cancellation arises most naturally as metalinguistic negation (MN). That
there is no inconsistency in this position is now conceded by B-R (1999), so
this is no longer a live issue and need not detain us long. However, he
reasserts his view that Horn's MN account of presupposition-denial cases
was most naturally and economically complemented by a semantically-based
account of presupposition, and that all that held Horn (1985) back from
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taking up this position was his mistaken view that a semantic approach to
presupposition entails the semantic ambiguity of the negation operator (a P-
preserving operator and a P-cancelling operator).
However, Horn's position was motivated not just by his acceptance of this
ambiguity view (standard among both the semantic and pragmatic
presupposition camps at the time), a view that B-R has indeed eﬀectively
rebutted, but also by his conviction that presupposition is simply not a
semantic relation (no matter what this entails about the semantics of
negation): `The abandonment of semantic presupposition [] was not
occasioned by perversity or whimsy, or solely by the specter of the ambiguity
of negation. The balance of the evidence leads me to agree with the prevailing
view (expressed most forcefully in Lycan 1984: chapter 4) that the conceptual
obscurities and implementational diﬃculties besetting the notion of logical
presupposition render it at best otiose for the description of natural language
semantics' (Horn 1989: 487). Again, in his review of B-R (1989b), Horn
(1990) restates his commitment to a pragmatic (Gricean) treatment of the
phenomenon of presupposition, and points out an important concession
made by B-R in the direction of the anti-presuppositionalists: the
vacuousness of a singular term does not always lead to a truth-value gap but
may be `irrelevant' to the falsity of the sentence in question. An example of
this is (1a), which is intuitively plainly false, and is accepted as such by B-R
(1989b: ch. 9):
(1) (a) The king of France is standing next to me.
(b) The king of France is bald.
(c) The king of France is standing next to an aardvark.
In Horn's view all three of these are false, in accordance with the anti-
presuppositional view, since all three have the false entailment, that there is
a king of France. The diﬀerence between them, leading to an intuition of
truth-valuelessness in the case of (1b), is in their veri®ability}falsi®ability; it's
an easy matter to determine that the king of France is not standing next to
me, while (1b) can only be falsi®ed indirectly by determining that France has
no king, and (1c) seems to be an intermediate case. Relative ease or diﬃculty
in determining the truth}falsity of a sentence}utterance does not bear on its
actual truth-value; it is not a semantic matter. Horn concludes his review:
`B-R's revised theory of semantic presupposition has the eﬀect of ``loosening
the tie between presupposition failure and lack of truth value'' (185). Loosen
that tie a bit more, and the doctrine of semantic presupposition falls of its
own weight. I have argued that that last step must in fact be taken, with
presupposition characterized as a pragmatic non-truth-conditional relation
supplementing an entailment-based approach to the king of France's
baldness incorporated within a bivalent Aristotelian semantics.' (Horn 1990:
501).
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It follows from the standard presuppositional view (the Frege-Strawson
account with its P-preserving negation operator) that presupposition-denials
are semantic contradictions. B-R (1999) argues that this should have made
the pull towards the semantic presuppositional line all the stronger for Horn
since the presupposition-denial cases appear to form a natural class with
Horn's other examples of MN. But this is really not a good line of argument.
It is only semantic presuppositionalists (including B-R (1989b), whose
account of P-preservation, though diﬀerent from Frege-Strawson's, was still
wholly semantic) who take P-denials to be intrinsically contradictory. Horn
did not, and, as B-R recognizes, the evidence I have presented (at least some
of it adapted from Horn (1990), by the way) shows that he, rather than the
semantic presuppositionalists, is right on this point: presupposition-denials
are not linguistic semantic contradictions. Furthermore, Horn has never
required, and clearly doesn't believe, that every case of MN is a semantic
contradiction; many of his other examples of MN are patently not cases of
descriptive contradiction at any level (see the sample given in Carston
(1998a: section 3.3)).
Horn did not face a dilemma. His position, which I endorse, was, and is,
that there are no semantic presuppositions, that sentence negation cancels all
entailments (including those that are intuitively presuppositional), that
presupposition-denials are not semantic contradictions, and that pre-
supposition-cancellation is most naturally manifest in an interpretation
which involves the metarepresentation of the positive presuppositional
utterance in the scope of negation. Where fault could be found with Horn is
in his omission of anything much by way of an account of the interpretive
processes which map the encoded semantics of the negative sentence
(presupposition-cancelling) onto the pragmatically derived metarepresen-
tational understanding (also presupposition-cancelling). I believe that my
relevance-theoretic account (Carston 1994, 1996, 1998a) remedies this
omission.
3.T wo accounts of the interpretation of presupposition-
denials
Let's move now to a comparison of B-R's and my accounts of the main sort
of case at issue here: the utterance of a negative presuppositional sentence,
followed by an explicit denial of the presupposition, focusing on those
instances where the ®rst interpretation accessed is descriptive, a contradiction
is derived, and a reinterpretation process results in an element of
metarepresentation in the scope of negation. For ease of exposition, I'll stick
to the standard existential case, represented schematically here:
(2) The F is not G; there is no F.
According to B-R (1999: 355±356), his 1993}97 account and mine in the
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paperhe isresponding to are very similar;they both lookas follows (omitting
the second clause which remains the same throughout):
(3) (i) encoded semantics: not [the F is G]
(ii) ®rst interpretation: [the F is not-G]
(iii) second interpretation: not [`the F is G']
This is correct as far as it goes, but it obscures a number of diﬀerences, of
which the main ones are (a) the interaction of the negation operator and the
existential presupposition in (i); (b) the principle responsible for the ®rst
interpretation, on which the presupposition is preserved; (c) the principle
responsible for the rejection of (ii) and the reanalysis leading to (iii). In the
following subsections, I look at each of these in turn.
3.1 The semantic encodings
On my account, there is no semantic relation of presupposition distinct from
ordinary entailment, and the negation operator is maximally wide in scope,
so it cancels all entailments of the corresponding positive; this is how the
representation in (3i) above is standardly construed. From that point on, it
is up to pragmatics to determine the relevant scope of the negation operator.
B-R's semantics is a more complicated matter. It too consists of a wide
scope negation which cancels all the entailments of its corresponding
positive. But among these cancelled entailments are presuppositions (weak-
but-not-strong entailments), speci®cally the existential presupposition, and
these are neither logically denied not logically aﬃrmed. They are not logically
denied because it is in the semantic nature of presuppositions that their
falsity alone cannot falsify a positive sentence that entails them, and they are
not logically aﬃrmed because they are in the scope of negation and so are
cancelled. Recall that B-R's ultimate aim here is to capture the intuition that
presuppositions are preserved under negation, but without assuming a
presupposition-preserving negation operator, against which he has presented
convincing arguments. So he shifts the terminology from `cancellation}
preservation' to the seemingly more pragmatic notions of `denial}
aﬃrmation' and says `the speaker who asserts not-A neither logically
aﬃrms nor logically denies the presuppositions of A' (my emphasis).
Because I ®nd this obscure, I make just two comments and move on: (a)
as regards the semantics of the sentence, surely all the entailments (both the
strong and the presuppositional) are cancelled, while none is denied (denial
being an act of a language user); (b) the determination that what a speaker
is denying is one or more of the strong entailments requires a process of
reasoning about the possible grounds for a speaker's utterance of the
negative sentence; this seems to be a pragmatic process.
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3.2 The presupposition-preserving interpretation
For current purposes, we are assuming that the interpretation of the negative
sentence which is accessed ®rst is the P-preserving interpretation. On my
account, this is but one of myriad cases of relevance-driven pragmatic
enrichment at the level of the proposition expressed. On B-R's account, it is
due to a quite general cognitive tendency towards bivalence (CTB), which
kicks in automatically because of the situation created by his encoded
semantics: the existential implication falls within the domain of denial (the
scope of the negation operator) but is not denied; hence it is tacitly aﬃrmed
(preserved). Before looking more closely at the operation of the cognitive
tendency (called the Cognitive Bivalence Principle in B-R (1993}97)), I'll
address some of the points B-R (1999) makes about my account and about
pragmatic treatments more generally.
3.2.1 Pragmatic accounts
In Carston (1998a), I began by making a broad distinction between semantic
presuppositionalists, who do not account for P-preservation pragmatically,
and anti-presuppositionalists (Atlas, Boer & Lycan, Horn, Kempson,
Wilson), who support a wide scope semantics for negation with a pragmatic
derivation of the P-preserving understanding; most of these analyses were
developed in the seventies and so the pragmatics was Gricean. I gave the
relevance-theoretic account in the last section of that paper, so at earlier
points characterized it as `broadly Gricean', since it plainly aligns with the
anti-presuppositionalists rather than the semantic presuppositionalists; so
much the worse for me, in B-R's view, since Gricean accounts of P-
preservation are no good.
Before I point out the respects in which a relevance-theoretic pragmatic
account diﬀers from a Gricean pragmatic account, I feel compelled to make
two demurring points regarding B-R's outline of a Gricean approach, neither
of which I will pursue in detail. First, Grice's own account of the P-
preserving understanding of negative sentences is given in terms of a manner
maxim of `conversational tailoring' (see Grice 1981). I summarize
drastically: assuming a Russellian semantics for descriptions and a wide
scope negation, the pragmatics of P-preservation involves a comparison
between diﬀerent ways of expressing the same set of truth conditions (the
negation of a set of three conjuncts: there is an F, there is at most one F,
whatever is F is G); the speaker's choice of the abbreviatory linguistic form
`The F is not G', rather than a longer form involving conjunction or
disjunction, invites the hearer to infer that the speaker implicates the
existence of a unique F. The idea is that the speaker has tailored her utterance
in such a way as to indicate which of the three truth conditions of the positive
sentence is the focus of her negation. So Grice's account is quite diﬀerent
from the `Gricean' account given by B-R and is not subject to the criticism
he levels.
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Second, and more important, B-R's `Gricean' account is not actually
Gricean at all, if by Gricean we mean an account that employs Grice's system
of maxims. Grice did not postulate a conversational maxim or pragmatic
principle of the sort B-R calls on in his critique: `Speakers are expected to
give as much information as is compatible with their beliefs' (B-R 1999: 357).
It doesn't take much thought to convince oneself that there is no such
conversational principle governing our exchanges; speakers do not spill forth
the contents of their minds willy nilly, and hearers do not expect, or wish,
them to. See Green (1995) for an interesting expose of the problems with any
such `volubility' principle. Grice's ®rst maxim of quantity is signi®cantly
diﬀerent from this: it is a principle requiring `sufficiency of information'
and it is relativized to the `current purposes of the conversation', it concerns
a speaker's overall conversational contribution, not just what she says, and
it is further constrained by being but one in a system of interacting maxims,
(the second quantity maxim, relevance and brevity all exercise a counter-
vailing in¯uence against excessive expressiveness).
I have to object to B-R's assertion that my account is not essentially
diﬀerent from the one he gives as Gricean. First, optimal relevance does not
incorporate any notion of maximal informativeness or volubility. Second, a
crucial ingredient in the relevance-theoretic account is cognitive effort, so,
in that respect at least, it is closer to the manner maxim account of Grice
(1981), as outlined above. Consider the following examples (which are B-R's
(1999) examples (19)±(21)):
(4) (a) The king of France is not bald.
(b) There is no king of France.
(c) There is a king of France and he is not bald.
My argument was that the use of (4a) to communicate the proposition
expressed by (4b) would not meet the criterion of optimal relevance since it
would involve the hearer in decoding and manipulating the concept BALD,
which has no role to play in the interpretation (does not lead to any cognitive
eﬀects). A speaker aiming at optimal relevance won't attempt this given the
obvious availability of the more economical (hence more relevant) utterance,
(4b).
When will a speaker choose to utter (4c) rather than (4a)? (4c) is longer
and, arguably, more syntactically complex (involving a conjunction) than
(4a), so on those grounds will require more processing eﬀort from the hearer.
On the other hand, in order to arrive at the same truth-conditional content
the hearer of (4a) has to pragmatically narrow the scope of the negation
operator. It follows from the precepts of Relevance theory that there is no
reason to expect speakers to be as explicit as possible, that is, they should
encode only what they cannot rely on their hearers to infer easily; semantic
encoding merely provides clues to, or constraints on, interpretation. The idea
is that the greater degree of spelling out that occurs in (4c) should arise only
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when the speaker has reason to doubt that the hearer will readily perform the
pragmatic inference of negation narrowing on (4a), perhaps because the
hearer has already expressed doubt about the existence of the king of
France.# Whatever the shortcomings of this account, it is not subject to the
criticisms B-R levels at it (but then nor is Grice's).
3.2.2 Cognitive bivalence
Let's move now to B-R's own analysis. Recall that the input to this is an
encoded semantic representation with a wide scope negation operator in
whose scope there is material which is neither logically denied nor logically
aﬃrmed. An independent, quite general, cognitive (non-semantic) tendency
or principle (the CTB) applies, so that, by default, that material is cognized
as aﬃrmed, because though it is in a domain of denial it has not been denied.
Intuitively, the idea that we have such a cognitive tendency to bivalence is
appealing and B-R backs it up with some nice examples. For instance, if X
is accused of cheating the expected response is a denial, so if X remains silent
she will standardly be taken to have tacitly aﬃrmed that she cheated; if Y
says to X ``You still love me, don't you?'' and X is silent, she will be taken
to have tacitly denied, in default of having overtly aﬃrmed, that she still loves
Y. In these cases the domain of denial or aﬃrmation is established
pragmatically and is less absolute than the ®xing of a domain by semantic
means.
Interesting though this is, it raises a lot of questions. The only example we
are given of a semantically established domain is a domain of denial which
is the scope of a negation operator. Can a `domain of aﬃrmation' also be
established semantically or not? If the negation operator establishes
semantically a domain of denial, what sort of linguistic element could
establish a domain of aﬃrmation? One possibility is simply any unnegated
sentence, the `S' of B-R's `Not-S'; others might be aﬃrmatory phrases into
which a sentence is embedded, for example, I aﬃrm that S, It is true that S,
S indeed. Assuming there are semantically given domains of aﬃrmation, the
next question is: can there be any element of meaning which lies within such
a domain but which is not aﬃrmed, so, by the CTB, is tacitly denied? If not
(and it does seem very unlikely), why not? Why should there be such an
asymmetry concerning domains semantically established but not concerning
[2] I don't claim to have succeeded yet in giving a fully satisfactory account, though I think
the direction is right; a complete story will have to confront the issue of the backgrounding
and foregrounding of information that comes from diﬀerent ways of linguistically
packaging one and the same truth-conditional content (see relevant remarks in Sperber &
Wilson (1986: 213±215)). Furthermore, it may be that a procedural semantics for de®nites,
as being developed by Breheny 1999, which instructs a hearer to treat a discourse referent
as given, strongly encourages the pragmatic narrowing of negation that excludes the
existential implication from its scope.
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domains pragmatically established? These questions are raised but not
addressed by B-R's exposition.
Second, fundamental to B-R's whole project is the assumption that we are
speakers of a bivalent language but a bivalent language with gaps. So in the
case where its presuppositional entailment is false, each of the following is
truth-valueless:
(5) (a) The king of France is wise.
(b) Mary has stopped pestering John.
(c) Bill regrets taking Maggie to the disco.
That these sentences are neither true nor false (when their presupposition is
false), is the basic intuition that any semantic presuppositionalist sets out to
model. But isn't this an odd intuition for creatures in the grip of the cognitive
tendency to bivalence to have? Shouldn't they be drawn toward ®nding these
either true or false, if at all possible? And, since, by hypothesis, each sentence
has a false entailment, shouldn't they simply ®nd them false? Some people
do, of course, but they are not semantic presuppositionalists. In brief, I ®nd
a tension in this theory between its respect for truth-value gaps and its
employment of a Cognitive Bivalence Principle.
Finally, let's consider the truth-value of the representation in (3ii), the P-
preservingpropositionexpressed,inthecasewhere,again,thepresupposition
concerning the existence of an F is false:
(3) (ii) [the F is not-G]
Once more, the intuition to be captured is that here there is a truth-value gap.
But there doesn't seem to be a gap on B-R's account; the result of the CTB
is that the existential implication is aﬃrmed, and since it is, by hypothesis,
false, the proposition expressed must be false. B-R (1999: 354) says that this
situation does not arise because the presupposition is `only tacitly and non-
truth-conditionally aﬃrmed by default'; that is, its falsity does not aﬀect
the truth conditions of the sentence}utterance. If we take this claim on
board, then the representation in (3ii) is misleading; the interpretation really
consists of two distinct representations: the encoded semantic representation
(in which the existential presupposition, though cancelled, is neither denied
nor aﬃrmed) and a representation aﬃrming that there is an F (which would
seem to be an implicature, since it is non-truth-conditional).
What, then, is the truth-conditional content of a P-preserving utterance of
the form `The F is not G'? The sentence itself seems to be truth-conditionally
underspeci®ed, awaiting some further process to establish the existential
implication as aﬃrmed or denied. On my view of natural language semantics,
sentences are quite generally underspeci®ed (so not truth-evaluable), and
pragmatic enrichment is required before the truth-conditional content of an
utterance is derived (see Carston 1998b) and brief discussion in section 4 of
this paper). But this is not B-R's view; his whole enterprise rests on the
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assumption that sentences encode propositions, truth-evaluable entities. Yet,
the sentences at issue appear not to be fully propositional and the default
implication induced by the CTB is non-truth-conditional; it seems to follow
that utterances of this sort do not actually express a full proposition, so do
not have determinate truth-conditional content.
If the semantic representation of a sentence of the form `The F is not G'
is not fully propositional, it is not truth-evaluable, so such a sentence is
neither true nor false, and we have a truth-value gap. But this, of course, is
not the right source of the truth-value gap intuition which presuppositional
theories try to capture, since it applies equally to cases where the existential
presupposition is true (for example, `there is a British prime minister'). This
is at odds with the logic of the theory, according to which sentences with true
presuppositions are either true or false. If the result of the application of the
CTB, the aﬃrmation of the existential implication, were able to contribute to
the truth-conditional content of these utterances, then they would indeed be
either true or false, but so would sentences with false presuppositions (which
are supposed to be truth-valueless). Again, there seems to be a tension
between the non-semantic account of P-preservation and the logic of a
semantic theory of presupposition.
3.3 Reanalysis in terms of metarepresentation
Throughout his work on these presupposition-denial examples, B-R poses
this question: what triggers the reanalysis into `metalinguistic negation'? As
he says, the answer that is implied by his (1993}7) account and the answer
that is given quite explicitly in my (1994) paper (and presented more fully in
1998a) are remarkably similar. They both involve the derivation of a
contradiction and it is this that triggers the process of reinterpretation; in
both cases the contradiction derived is not a function of the encoded
semantic content alone but involves a further non-semantic process, a
pragmatic one for me and an automatic cognitive one for him.
However, I want to emphasize that the question just posed is but a
particular case of a broader question: quite generally, what motivates the
move to an interpretation involving metarepresentation? Notice, by the way,
that this question, like the more speci®c one asked by B-R, assumes that,
when there is no explicit indicator of a metarepresentational use, the
interpretation tried ®rst is inevitably entirely descriptive (that is, it does not
involve metarepresentation). This is false, as I have argued in the two papers
referred to above: in certain contexts the metarepresentational interpretation
is simply the most accessible one. So these questions arise for just those
metarepresentational cases where a descriptive interpretation is in fact the
®rst one tested for adequacy.
The wider question concerning metarepresentation is probably a subcase
of an even wider one: when an analysis is rejected and a pragmatic process
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of reanalysis is undertaken, what motivates that reanalysis? The general
answer to all three of these progressively more inclusive questions is: an
interpretation is rejected and a reanalysis undertaken when that ®rst
interpretation fails to meet whatever pragmatic criterion communicators
employ in settling for a particular interpretation as the intended one. There
are a variety of criteria on the market involving a variety of notions,
including truth}plausibility, informativeness, relevance and coherence. The
issue of which of these is correct does not matter here, besides which a
contradiction is bound to fail any and all of these criteria: contradictions are
false, uninformative, irrelevant and incoherent. The central point, though, is
that reanalysis is the result of an interpretive dead-end, diagnosed as such by
whatever general principles}criteria constitute one's pragmatic theory. Both
contradictions and tautologies are sure®re ways of missing the target:
(6) (a) The pretty girl isn't (at all) pretty.
(b) The pretty girl is (indeed) pretty.
(adapted from Noh 1998: ch. 3)
On a descriptive interpretation, neither of these is satisfactory. In relevance-
theoretic terms, neither achieves any cognitive eﬀects and it is this that leads
to a reanalysis, on which the ®rst occurrence of pretty is taken to be
echoically used; that is, to represent some other representation (whether an
utterance or a thought), attributed to someone, which predicates prettiness
of the girl. The reanalysis meets the expectation of relevance since it achieves
eﬀects concerning the speaker's disagreement (in (6a)) or agreement (in (6b))
with the view expressed by the producer of the original representation. Any
consideration of this wider issue of the motivation for aborting a line of
analysis and trying again is conspicuously missing from B-R's discussions
(from 1989 to 1999), despite his phrase `pragmatic reanalysis'.
3.4 Assessment of the analyses
B-R dismisses both Gricean and relevance-theoretic pragmatic accounts of
the two stage presupposition-denial interpretations. He himself has no
overall pragmatic theory backing his explanation of the interpretive stages,
but calls on two distinct forces at work in arriving at the two interpretations,
the P-preserving and the metarepresentational: the Cognitive Tendency to
Bivalence and the unacceptability of a contradiction. In fact, it's not clear
why a contradiction should lead to a metarepresentational reanalysis as
opposed to some other sort of reanalysis (a pragmatic enrichment or
loosening of some of the content, or a decision that the proposition expressed
is not communicated but is merely the vehicle for the communication of some
implicatures, for instance). A contradiction, not derived solely through
linguistic decoding, does play its part in my account as in B-R's; the
diﬀerence is that in mine it is underpinned by a pragmatic theory, built
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around the central de®nition of optimal relevance, which accounts for why
a contradiction is unacceptable. The very same pragmatic theory accounts
for the initial P-preserving interpretation, without having to invoke any other
principles to do the work.
A ®nal critical point: by following B-R's focus on the interpretation
represented schematically in (3), (or as (18) and (40) in B-R's paper), it is easy
to forget that this is only one of the four possible processing routes for
presupposition-denials. In certain contexts, a metarepresentational interpret-
ation will be the ®rst interpretation accessed, and there is the less likely, but
possible, wide scope descriptive interpretation (whether derived on a ®rst
pass or as a result of reanalysis). Such is the rigidity of B-R's account that
the only possibility it allows for is the one given in (3) above; in this respect,
the P-preserving interpretation seems still to be more semantic than
pragmatic, since it arises automatically as a result of the semantics given for
negative sentences with a presupposition in the scope of the negation; the
cognitive tendency to bivalence cannot but complete the work started by the
encoded semantics (see B-R (1999: 353)). I note also that the point made in
Carston (1998a: section 6.2) about clause-reversed presupposition-denials,
such as (7a) still stands:
(7) (a) There is no F, (so) the F is not G.
(b) The F is not G, (as) there is no F.
Although putting the correction clause ®rst will generally preclude the
derivation of the contradictory interpretation, which leads to a reanalysis, B-
R's account predicts exactly the same interpretive stages for (7a) (hence
double processing), as are standardly involved in understanding the ordering
in (7b), which is the only sort of case he considers. This important problem
for B-R's account remains to be addressed.
4.T he semantics}pragmatics distinction again
B-R raises questions about what the semantics}pragmatics distinction
amounts to. He points out that there are various ways of construing
`semantics': as encoded linguistic meaning, as the truth-conditional content
of the minimal proposition expressed (something like Grice's `what is said')
or the truth-conditional content of some richer, pragmatically augmented,
proposition expressed. I agree. However, it doesn't follow from this that my
use of the distinction in the paper under discussion is unclear or unhelpful,
since it is plainly stated that the distinction involved, the semantics}
pragmatics distinction of Relevance theory, is one between the meaning that
is encoded by the linguistic system itself and the further meaning that is
communicated. So it entails a distinction between two types of cognitive
process employed in understanding utterances: decoding and inference. For
quite detailed discussion of the distinction viewed in this way, and of a range
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of other ways of drawing it, on the basis of diﬀerent ways of construing
semantics, see Carston 1998c.
B-R takes issue with my suggestion that he has a `conception of
pragmatics as a fairly thin icing on a substantial semantic cake'. He points
out that both of our analyses of presupposition-denials, shown in (3), seem
roughly equal in their relative apportionings of interpretive work to semantic
decoding and to pragmatics (or, at least to whatever processes are responsible
for the derivation of unencoded utterance meaning). Let's suppose that is
right, setting aside the issues of just what status to give to the Cognitive
Tendency to Bivalence, and the inability of the nonsemantic part of B-R's
account to capture the various other possible interpretive routes, as
mentioned in the previous section.
However, he and I understand the `cake}icing' metaphor diﬀerently. He
takes the cake to be semantics and the icing pragmatics and, in objecting to
the quoted statement, emphasizes his taste for thick icing. I prefer to keep the
cake large and rich, and the icing thin; it's just that pragmatics is the cake
and semantics is the icing. On the relevance-theoretic conception, pragmatic
inferential activity is an automatic response of receivers of ostensive stimuli
(which carry a presumption of optimal relevance); it is but a particular
instance of our general propensity to interpret human behaviour in terms of
the mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) of the behaver, which, in its
turn, is to be located within a bigger picture of general relevance-seeking
information processing. According to this view, pragmatic inference is
fundamental (the cake) and the employment of a code (linguistic system) as
an ostensive stimulus is a helpful addition (icing). This has been argued for
in considerable detail by Sperber & Wilson (1986}95), Sperber (1994) and
Carston (1998b), and is backed up by evolutionary considerations in Sperber
(1990).
On my account of the interpretation of utterances of negative pre-
suppositional sentences, pragmatic inference mediates between the linguis-
tically encoded content and the P-preserving proposition expressed, which is
the truth-conditional content of the utterance. B-R (1999: 356) refers to
`Carston's own suggestion (1998b) that implicatures may contribute to the
explicit truth-conditional content of what is communicated'. This is
misleading, since implicatures are, by de®nition, non-truth-conditional. An
important idea in Relevance theory (around at least as far back as Wilson &
Sperber 1981) is that relevance-guided pragmatic inference contributes to the
derivation of what is communicated explicitly as well as to what is
communicated implicitly (implicatures). In addition to the two obvious
processes of disambiguation and reference assignment, there are pragmatic
processes of recovering unarticulated constituents, of enriching the lexically
encoded content, of loosening the lexically encoded content, and of
overriding aspects of linguistic content altogether (in the case of recognized
slips of the tongue). The inference to a P-preserving interpretation of `The F
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is not G' is a case of pragmatic enrichment. These various pragmatic
inferences do not eventuate in implicatures, but develop the underspeci®ed
logical form, linguistically encoded by the utterance, into the proposition the
hearer takes the speaker to have communicated explicitly.
5.M etarepresentation and negation
In Carston (1994, 1996), I reanalysed Horn's cases of metalinguistic negation
as cases of echoic negation, where an echoic use is one which involves
metarepresenting and attributing an utterance (or part of) or a thought (or
part of), and expressing an attitude to it (broadly, either endorsement or
dissociation). The negation operator is its standard truth-functional self, but
some of the material falling within it is used echoically; in the case of an
echoed utterance (as opposed to thought), the focus of the negation could
be a matter of form or of content. While broadly supporting this, B-R makes
the point that `¼since we don't generally issue denials out of the blue, a
vanishingly small proportion of attested uses of negation will fail to be
relevant examples by her echo criterion' (B-R 1999: 362); it follows that, if
our intuition about the distinct nature of truly metalinguistic cases is to be
captured, ®ner classi®cation within this broad category of echoic negation is
required. This is an important point, which I shall try to address. In the next
section, I look at a range of types of metarepresentational use, before coming
to the very speci®c phenomenon of `!MN', whose properties, as B-R has
shown, are especially well highlighted by the two possible interpretations of
echoed slips of the tongue, discussed in section 5.2. In the ®nal section, I
return to the issue of the interpretation of the negation operator itself.
5.1 Types of metarepresentational use$
There are several closely related, but subtly diﬀerent, terms in play in this
general area, including `metarepresentation', `mention', and `echo'. The
broadest of these is the ®rst, and while I do not think that all negation is
echoic, it may well be that all negation is metarepresentational. Consider the
following diagram of types of metarepresentational use, which draws on the
much more detailed survey in Wilson (forthcoming):
[3] This section owes a great deal to recent work on metarepresentational use within relevance
theory by Eun-Ju Noh and Deirdre Wilson; see references.
[4] I am not drawing here the ®ner distinction made in Relevance theory between attributive
use, whose relevance lies with the information reported and echoic use, which can be
thought of as an attributive use whose main relevance lies with the attitude expressed to
the attributed representation. Direct and indirection quotation are cases where an
utterance or thought is attributed without the speaker necessarily expressing her attitude
to the representation. When a representation is used attributively within the scope of
negation, a speaker cannot but express a dissociative attitude to the representation. For
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Naturally, all of these types of metarepresentational use can occur in both
positive sentences and negative sentences. Here's an example of each type of
use, where the fact that it is metarepresentational is not overtly signalled (for
instance, by a phrase like X as you put it,o rthe word X), but has to be
pragmatically inferred:
(9) A: I'd like tom[eiDouz] for lunch.
B: I'm not very keen on tom[eiDouz].
(10) A: It's a lovely day.
B: It's not a lovely day; it's humid and heavy.
(11) Boston has two syllables.
(12) John is a bachelor entails John is unmarried.
In (9) and (10), B echoes an aspect of A's utterance, in (9) her pronunciation
of the word tomatoes (a case of (1a) in the diagram in (8)), in (10) the
proposition she expressed ((1b) in the diagram). In (9) there is a further
pragmatic indeterminacy, in that she may be expressing her dislike of the
fruit tomatoes and playfully imitating A's pronunciation, or she may be
expressing disapproval of the pronunciation and saying nothing at all about
the fruit (unless she follows up with ``but I do like tom[a:touz]'' or ``and I
don't like tom[a:touz] either''). If B's utterance in (10) had not been preceded
by A's, it could have been intended as an echo of a thought that she attributes
to A (so an instance of (2) in the diagram). Examples (11) and (12) involve
metarepresentation of the word Boston and the proposition `John is a
bachelor', respectively (so are cases of (3a) and (3b) in the diagram). Note
that the only diﬀerence between (1a) and (3a), and (1b) and (3b), is that in
the former, but not in the latter, the metarepresented material is treated as
a property of an utterance or thought, either actual or potential, attributed
to some particular speaker. As far as I am aware, the term `mention' has
been standardly used for cases that fall under (3) (especially (3a),
metalinguistic), such as (11), where ``Boston'' is used to refer to the word
Boston, not to someone's utterance of the word Boston.
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I need to do two things before attempting to locate B-R's `!MN' in this
picture. I have to address his point that it begins to look as if all cases of
negation are echoic, in which case my reconstrual of Horn's MN as echoic
negation seems to lose the intuitively clear distinction between the
metalinguistic cases and ordinary descriptive negations. Secondly, B-R
characterizes his narrower class of !MN as involving an `echoic use}mention
mix', so I will take a look at diﬀerent ways in which use (that is, truth-based
representation) and metarepresentation (resemblance-based representation)
may occur together in one and the same utterance.
The example in (10B), in which the content of someone's utterance or
thought is echoed, seems, on the face of it, indistinguishable from a case of
descriptive negation. However, I think there is a distinction to be made,
though it is a subtle one. Wilson (forthcoming) attributes to Dan Sperber the
suggestion that, though not all negative utterances are echoic, they may all
be metarepresentational. That is, cases of what are thought of as descriptive
negation may, in fact, involve non-echoic metarepresentational use; they
may metarepresent propositions or abstract hypotheses not attributed to
anyone and so fall into category (3b) in the diagram. This idea captures the
widespread intuition that negative sentences}utterances are marked, relative
to their corresponding positives, and that processing of a negative in some
sense presupposes the availability of the corresponding positive (see Horn
1989: ch. 3). Whether (10B) is interpreted as descriptive (that is, as the
negation of a metarepresented proposition) or as echoic (that is, as a case of
expressing dissociation from an attributed thought or utterance) is a matter
for pragmatic inference, and may yield diﬀerences in cognitive eﬀects.
This goes some way toward meeting B-R's objection that the vast bulk of
actual utterances of negative sentences will qualify as echoic `since we don't
generally issue denials out of the blue'. There are denials which are not
echoic but which are metarepresentational; that is, they deny the existence of
a state of aﬀairs by negating an accessible hypothesis that it does exist.
However, as B-R insists, there are ®ner distinctions to be made, distinctions
within the general category of echoic negations, subclasses characterized by
what sort of representation is echoed (phonological, lexical, syntactic,
conceptual, etc) and, crucially, how this is combined with elements of
descriptive use within the same utterance.
Consider some examples of metalinguistic use combined with genuine
descriptive statements, cases known as `mixed quotation' in the literature
(see, for instance, Seymour 1994, Cappelen & Lepore 1997a and Tsohatzidis
1998). The examples are adapted from Noh (1998: ch. 2).
(13) A: Have some tom[eiDouz].
B1: I had some tom[eiDouz] for lunch.
B2: I won't have those tom[eiDouz]. They look rotten.
B3: I won't have those tom[eiDouz], as you call them.
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B1 states that he had tomatoes for lunch, and simultaneously echoes an
aspect of A's pronunciation, perhaps for some sort of playful eﬀect.
Similarly, B2 makes a descriptive statement with her negative utterance,
while also echoing the phonetic form `tom[eiDouz]'; she expresses the
proposition that she does not want a particular set of tomatoes, while also
echoically metarepresenting an aspect of A's pronunciation. Note also that,
as in the standard cases of metalinguistic negation, the echoic use is not
explicitly encoded, as it is in B3. But B2 is not a case of !MN, or even of MN
in Horn's wider sense, as we see when we compare it with a clear example of
the phenomenon of interest to B-R:
(14) She doesn't like tom[eiDouz], but she's quite fond of tom[a:touz].
One of the diﬀerences between this sort of case and the cases of mixed
quotation is that the ultimate point of (14) is not to make any descriptive
statement concerning tomatoes at all, but to explicate a linguistic or
conceptual mistake. In !MN the echoed element is the focus of the negation,
while in (13) it eﬀectively lies outside the scope of the negation. To further
elucidate what he means by a use-mention mix, B-R compares two diﬀerent
interpretations of B's utterance in (15), depending on whether it is an answer
to (A1) or a response to (A2):
(15)A 1: What's the correct pronunciation of this word? Is it eSOTeric?
A2: Myra's poem is totally eSOTeric.
B: It's not eSOTeric ± it's esoTERic.
Once reference is correctly assigned to the two pronouns, in the two cases, we
get:
(16) (a) The correct pronunciation of this word is not eSOTeric ± the
correct pronunciation of this word is esoTERic.
(b) Myra's poem is not eSOTeric ± Myra's poem is esoTERic.
What are the crucial properties distinguishing (16a) and (16b)? A striking
one is that (16b) requires a great deal more pragmatic inference before the
hearer will have arrived at the intended ®nal interpretation, while there is no
obvious further pragmatic indeterminacy to be resolved in (16a). Compare
each of them with the following approximate but indicative representations
of the proposition recovered as part of the ®nal interpretation in each case:
(17) (a) not (the correct pronunciation of the word esoteric is [eSOTeric]);
(the correct pronunciation of the word esoteric is [esoTERic])
(b) not (the correct pronunciation of the word esoteric used to
describe Myra's poem is [eSOTeric]; the correct pronunciation of
the word esoteric used to describe Myra's poem is [esoTERic]
A comparison of (16b) with (17b) shows that much of the ®nal interpretation
of (16b) is implicit, requiring considerable pragmatic supplementation.
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Furthermore, in many contexts, the most accessible interpretation of the
negative sentence, processed ®rst on its own, is very diﬀerent from that given
in (17b). It is an interpretation along the lines of the mixed quotation case in
(13B2): the speaker is taken to be disagreeing with some aspect of the
content of the previous utterance, while also echoing (by the way, as it were)
a particular formal property of that utterance: the speaker's stress pattern on
the word esoteric. However, the hearer will be forced to reject this
interpretation and do another round of processing before the ®nal
interpretation is reached; that's the purpose of the second (correction)
clause, which is clearly an essential component of !MN. In the standard
`mixed quotation' cases, the descriptive interpretation is the main element of
what is communicated, while in the !MN cases the formal echo (and its
correction) is the central point and the descriptive interpretation is an
amusing diversion. So, as regards the diagram in (8), !MN is a subclass of
(1a), the echo of a formal aspect of an utterance, but it is a subclass with
rather special additional properties.
As well as (in fact, as a result of) this particular `tricky, humorous mixture
of use and mention', in all instances of the phenomenon of !MN, a
contradiction is recovered in the process of interpretation. The relation of
contradiction holds between the negative sentence and the follow-up
correction clause, so it is clear that cases of !MN must all have this two-
clause structure. No negative sentence on its own is going to be a case of
!MN. B-R says it is a pragmatically derived contradiction, but I assume he
means either a semantic or a pragmatic contradiction. The contradiction may
be a function of semantic encoding (as in the cases where a formal linguistic
property is the focus of the negation and correction, such as (14) above) or
it may be a result of a pragmatic (or, at least non-semantic) inference, which
strengthens the negative utterance in such a way that it becomes inconsistent
with the following correction clause. A pragmatically induced contradiction
arises in the case of the P-denials, as discussed in section 3 above, and,
according to B-R, it also occurs on a certain interpretation of metalinguistic
negations involving the correction of slips of the tongue. I look at these, and
at the contradictoriness requirement more generally, in the next section.
5.2 `!MN' and the contradiction requirement
For communication to succeed it is sometimes necessary for pragmatic
inference to overrule the determinate dictates of the linguistic system, and
this it is often able to do. Consider some examples of this:
(18) (a) She always ¯aunts the rules.
(b) The penguins have eaten all our cabbages.
(spoken in an English garden)
In (18a) the speaker uses the wrong lexical form for her intended concept of
VIOLATE, either because she simply has the wrong concept-form mapping
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in her lexicon or because she has made an on-the-spot slip of the tongue from
¯out to ¯aunt;( 18b) is, most likely, of the latter production error variety. In
many instances, these will be correctly interpreted, that is, interpreted in line
with the speaker's informative intention, although she hasn't produced the
best possible linguistic evidence to ensure ful®lment of that intention.&
B-R makes the interesting and important point that there are two quite
distinct interpretations of B's utterance in (19), both of which involve
recognizing that B is echoing A's mistake.
(19) A: She always ¯aunts the rules.
B: She doesn't FLAUNT the rules; she FLOUTS them.
In the one case, B is echoing the concept SHOW OFF, objecting to it and
correcting it to VIOLATE; in the process, she is also echoing the linguistic
form used, but is not objecting to it per se. In the other, she is echoing and
correcting just the lexical form used by the original speaker to express the
concept VIOLATE and, although also metarepresenting that concept, which
she takes the speaker to have intended, is not objecting to it. In the ®rst case,
the echo is metaconceptual, while in the second, we have a purely
metalinguistic echoic use. On an entirely descriptive understanding (perhaps
accessed before the echoic use is recognized), the propositional content of the
two interpretations is as follows:
(20) (a) X doesn't show oﬀ the rules; she violates them.
(b) X doesn't violate the rules, she violates them.
So while both of the ultimate intended interpretations are cases of echoic
negation, as I have de®ned it, only the second one, which involves the
descriptive contradiction in (20b), and an echo and correction of a formal
linguistic property, is a case of the phenomenon of !MN.' A more
transparent representation of B's utterance on this interpretation would be
(21), where the bracketings enclose phonetic representations:
(21) She doesn't [¯utnt] the rules; she [¯a?ts] them.
Whether these examples are cases of pragmatic contradiction, as B-R
maintains, or of semantically (mis)encoded contradiction is not perfectly
[5] The importance of these misuse examples as data for a cognitively-based pragmatics, such
as that of Relevance theory, is discussed brie¯y in Carston (1998b, 1998c), and in more
detail in Carston (in preparation).
[6] Something like the converse of this phenomenon may also occur:
(i) I didn't buy any tom[eiDouz] but I did buy some tom[a:touz].
(ii) It isn't mongeese that have caused the damage; it's mongooses.
Here the idea is that mongeese and mongooses are to be taken as encoding distinct animal
concepts and so as having diﬀerent extensions; this is either intended as a jokey pretence
(a suggestion made by McCawley (1991: 190)) or the speaker in fact believes, mistakenly,
that they encode distinct concepts (see B-R's (1999) example (32), where El Kuds and
Jerusalem might be believed by the speaker to name diﬀerent cities). An account of the
processes involved in the diﬀerent possible understandings of these examples remains to be
given.
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clear to me. The pragmatic work of recognizing that ¯aunt is taken to encode
VIOLATE in the exchange in (19) is undertaken by B in her understanding
of A's initial utterance; since it is A's (mis)encoding, when their roles switch
and A is the interpreter of B's response, A derives the descriptive
contradiction in (20b) by decoding alone. I don't think the example is
essentially diﬀerent from the `tom[eiDouz]}tom[a:touz]' and `mongeese}
mongooses' cases. (There is a large issue looming here around whether a
language is to be conceived of as fundamentally idiolectal or social}
communal.)
Of the instances of !MN that B-R discusses, only the presupposition-
denials are clearly pragmatic (or, at least, non-semantic). A corollary of this
is that presupposition-denials are also alone in that what is being objected to
is not some aspect of linguistic form but is a matter of content; given a
metalinguistic}metaconceptual distinction as in the diagram in (8), these are
cases where the echoic use is metaconceptual, though they have the key
properties of !MN: tricky use}mention mix, descriptive contradiction and an
echoic reanalysis. Question: are there any other metaconceptual cases of
!MN and should !MN be understood as crosscutting the metalinguistic}
metaconceptual distinction?
Consider the following examples:
(22) (a) A: You're not going to sack him, are you?
B: No, I'm not going to sack him; I'm going to kill him.
(b) A: That letter has to reach Bill by tomorrow at the latest. I hope
you've put it in the mail.
B: I haven't put it in the mail; I've delivered it to him by hand.
(c) No, young man, smoking marijuana isn't a misdemeanour
in these parts; it's a felony.
(d) Keeping the kids entertained isn't cheap; it's free, when
you visit our megastore.
(e) We don't sell cheap cars; we sell cars cheap.
These are mostly attested cases (variously from TV shows and motorway
billboards); they all have the standard format of a negative sentence followed
by a correction clause and achieved, for me at least, the sort of rhetorical
eﬀects (due to descriptive garden-pathing and consequent reanalysis) typical
of cases of !MN. They are clearly not descriptive contradictions as a matter
of linguistic encoding: killing someone doesn't entail sacking him, delivering
a letter by hand does not entail mailing it, being a felony doesn't entail being
a misdemeanour, etc. Are they pragmatically derived contradictions? It does
seem that on a ®rst processing pass, the overall interpretation of the negative
sentence (that is, the proposition expressed and implicatures) is inconsistent
with the proposition expressed by the following clause. For instance, in (22a),
the negative clause may be interpreted along the lines of `I will do something
less bad than sack him (perhaps, just reprimand him)'; in (22b), `The letter
384notes and discussion
won't reach Bill by the required time'; in (22c), `The marijuana smoker
won't be charged with a criminal oﬀence'; in (22d), `Keeping the kids
entertained is an expensive business'; in (22e) `Our cars are expensive'. So,
on a wider, pragmatic, conception of contradiction, it would seem that these
cases do meet the contradiction requirement of !MN. There is a `use-mention
mix' too, though what is mentioned (or, in my terms, echoed) is conceptual
rather than linguistic}formal; as a result of the metaconceptual reanalysis,
the proposition recovered is something like the following:
(23) not (the correct description of what I'm going to do to is `sack him');
(the correct description of what I'm going to do is `kill him').
I oﬀer a last set of examples for consideration:
(24) (a) I didn't buy a car; I bought a dream.
[uttered by a man shortly after buying James Bond's car]
(b) Bill isn't a butcher; he's an artist.
[where Bill is, by profession, a butcher]
(c) John's not a man; he's a machine.
Again, these are not descriptive contradictions by virtue of semantic
encoding: being a dream doesn't entail being a car, being an artist doesn't
entail being a butcher, etc. Does ®rst pass processing result in a pragmatic
contradiction, as B-R requires of cases of !MN? In processing (24a), which
occurred in a radio interview, I was brie¯y baﬄed by my initial descriptive
interpretation of the negative utterance, since it was blatantly contradicted
by the highly salient contextual assumption that he had indeed bought a car
(which was the subject of the interview). The metaphorical use in the follow-
up clause, and the processing that that involved, prompted a reanalysis of the
negative sentence, perhaps along the following lines:
(25) not (what I bought is appropriately termed `a car')
These examples do have many of the processing properties of B-R's cases of
!MN, but I remain unsure whether they qualify or not.(
Finally on this contradiction issue, let's return to the presupposition-
denials. Recall that a major motivation for B-R in distinguishing the
phenomenon of !MN was to establish it, rather than broader notions of
metalinguistic or echoic negation, as giving rise to the relevant complex of
cognitiveand pragmaticprocesses involvedin accounting for presupposition-
cancellation, which is semantically impossible in his theory. The explanation
[7] An alternative analysis of some examples of this sort is advanced in Carston (1997),
according to which the reprocessing results, not in anything metarepresentational, but in
an ad hoc concept in the scope of the negation, constructed by a pragmatic process of
narrowing an encoded lexical concept. For instance, the CAR concept is narrowed to one
which excludes certain atypical cars, such as that of James Bond; the BUTCHER concept
is narrowed so as to denote just your average prototypical butcher, etc.
385journal of linguistics
in terms of !MN should, therefore, account for the interpretation of both of
the following, since both are cases of a presupposition-cancelling inter-
pretation:
(26) (a) The king of France isn't handsome, since there is no king of
France.
(b) There is no king of France, so the king of France is not handsome.
As discussed brie¯y in section 3.4 above, intuitively, there is a diﬀerence in
the inferential processes required in the interpretation of each of these;
although (26b) probably involves an echoic use of the phrase the king of
France as in (26a), it does not (or is much less likely to) involve descriptive
garden-pathing, resulting in a contradiction, and consequent pragmatic
reanalysis. The explanation for this is that the correction clause (denying the
existence of the king of France) is processed ®rst, and so blocks a descriptive
interpretation of the following de®nite description. Then (26b) is not
obviously a case of !MN, because a descriptive contradiction is not derived
in its on-line processing. It seems that !MN is too narrow and particular a
phenomenon to serve in the general pragmatic account of presupposition-
cancellation cases, which B-R's semantic account of presupposition needs,
and that, after all, my wider notion of echoic negation is the appropriate one
here.
5.3 Truth-functional negation and the rhetorical device of `!MN'
Paraphrasing B-R, !MN is that subset of cases of implicitly echoic negation
which have the following properties:
A. They involve two stages of processing; ®rst, a tier of descriptive
interpretation, which is rejected, and second, an echoic interpretation.
B. The rejection is caused by a contradiction derived in the on-line, left-to-
right pragmatic processing of the utterance as descriptive.
C. The negation operator on the ®nal metarepresentational interpretation is
understood non-truth-functionally.
I turn now to the third of these characteristics. Discussing the `Myra's
poem' example ((16b) above), B-R says: `!MN is non-truth-functional in this
sense: it involves a departure from the interpretation implied by construing
the negation as operating on the truth value assigned to the use of a predicate
descriptively applied to the referent of the subject (Myra's poem). Instead it
conveys an objection to something (a pronunciation) not subjectable to a
truth function like negation' (B-R 1999: 360). Horn (1989: 434) makes a very
similar point in response to my earlier assertion that, in all cases of
metalinguistic negation, the negation operator is truth-functional. I won't
repeat in full the arguments given in Carston & Noh (1995: 6±10) and
Carston (1996: 327±29), which, as far as I am aware, have not been
countered, or even addressed. Still, it's worth recalling in this context the
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Gershwin song Let's call the whole thing oﬀ, which begins `You like po-tay-
to and I like po-tah-to'. Does this case of a `tricky use-mention mix' render
the conjunction operator non-truth-functional? Surely not.
Noh (1998: ch. 3) adds further support for our truth-functional view, by
presenting a range of examples which have all the crucial properties of !MN,
but which cannot possibly be held to involve some special meaning in the
negation operator, since there is no negation operator:
(27) (a) A: Would you like some tom[eiDouz]?
B: Well, I'd prefer some tom[attouz].
(b) A: Did you see mongeese?
B: I only saw mongooses.
On an initial descriptive interpretation, B's utterance in (27a) is con-
tradictory, as shown in (28a); on an echoic reanalysis, the proposition
recovered is along the lines of (28b).
(28) (a) B prefers tomatoes to tomatoes.
(b) B prefers to have something described as `tom[attouz]' rather than
something described as `tom[eiDouz]'.
Here we eﬀectively have !MN without negation; presumably, the verb prefer
is not to be given an interpretation that diﬀers from its standard descriptive
one.
What Noh and I want to emphasize is that, while there is no reason to
suppose that the negation operator takes on a non-truth-functional meaning,
there is certainly much pragmatic work required in recovering the
propositional form which falls within the scope of this truth-functional
negation, in the ®nal interpretation of the utterance. This has already been
indicated above in examples (17b) and (23). Let's review the representational
stages involved in interpreting example (16b).
(29) (a) not (Myra's poem is esoteric); Myra's poem is esoteric.
(b) not (Myra's poem is `eSOTeric']; Myra's poem is `esoTERic'.
(c) not (Myra's poem is correctly described using the pronunciation
`eSOTeric']; her dissertation is correctly described using the
pronunciation `esoTERic'.
(29a) is the proposition taken to have been expressed on the initial descriptive
interpretation; it has been developed from the encoded logical form; since it
is contradictory, it is rejected. As B-R says, the only perceptible (or, at least,
the most perceptible) diﬀerence between the two sentences uttered (apart
from the polarity diﬀerence) is the pronunciation of the word esoteric,s oi t
seems that attention is being called to that, rather than to any aspect of
content. Since pronunciation is not a matter of conceptual content, but, in
the normal course of things, a vehicle for making public some conceptual
content, it has to be treated here as a case of mention or metarepresentation,
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as in (29b). This representation is not propositional, that is, it is truth-
conditionally underspeci®ed; it does not encode a coherent, truth-evaluable
form. However, it does not follow from this that the `not' receives a non-
truth-functional interpretation. Under pressure to ®nd the relevant prop-
ositional form, the pragmatic mechanism responds to the clues it has (the
descriptive interpretation of esoteric having been ruled out) and enriches the
form in (29b) to that in (29c) which, as B-R says, is `the only coherent,
rational overall interpretation'.
Finally, what sort of a phenomenon is !MN? Why should this particular
small subclass of cases of echoic negations, with this odd admixture of
properties, be singled out? The answer seems to lie not with any particular
linguistic or pragmatic status it has, but with its rhetorical eﬀectiveness. The
inferential processing it triggers results ®rst in a garden-path, followed by
easy rerouting along a new line of interpretation; the eﬀects are both
humorous and corrective. It is a rather curious fact, perhaps worth some
re¯ection, that a great deal of heavy-weight theoretical reshuﬄing, in
accounting for the interaction of negation and presupposition, has been
prompted by a verbal scheme whose main feature is its comic potential.)
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